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DEATH BEFORE DISHONOR OR DISHONOR
BEFORE DEATH? CHRISTIAN JUST WAR,
TERRORISM, AND SUPREME EMERGENCY
DARRELL COLE*
In his introduction to a recent anthology of war writing,
John Keegan concludes:
Many who read it [this anthology] will understandably be
horrified by the record of inhumanity that the testimonies
from the non-European world depict. The history of all
forms- of warfare is, however, essentially inhumane. That
should be the message of this collection of warrior words
from the European and non-European worlds.'
Warfare is a conflict, brutal to varying degrees, in which one
group of people uses force to exert its will on another group of
people. This has been the essential nature of warfare from its
conception. War could be and usually was brutal from the very
beginning, and it continues to be so. This is an important point.
New technologies have not changed the essential nature of bat-
tle. Certainly technological advances have given us the ability to
make battle more destructive (and sometimes less destructive),
but these technological advances do not alter the essential nature
of war.
Technological advances, moreover, have done nothing to
improve the behavior of fighting ground troops, the necessity of
which is still evident, barring nuclear holocaust. No amount of
conventional weaponry can eliminate the process of ground
fighting somewhere down the line, even if it is mere "clean up"
or "occupation" duty, which always entails some amount of bitter
fighting. In other words, technological advances have not and
will not eliminate scenes like this one:
The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses
and temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing
neither youth nor age but killing all they fell in with, one
after the other, children and women, and even the beasts
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1. THE BOOK OF WAR: 25 CENTURIES OF GREAT WAR WRITING XiX (John
Keegan ed., 1999).
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of burden, and whatever other living creature they saw; the
Thracian people, like the bloodiest of the barbarians,
being ever most murderous when it has nothing to fear.
Everywhere confusion reigned and death in all its shapes;
and in particular they attacked a boys' school, the largest
there was in the place, into which the children had just
gone, and massacred them all. In short, the disaster falling
upon the whole city was unsurpassed in magnitude, and
unapproached by any in suddenness and horror.
2
One could all too easily transfer Thucydides's prose to
numerous more recent episodes in Bosnia. Battle behavior is
often, as Keegan suggests, inhumane, but it need not be unjust,
and this is the essential point of classical Christian just war doc-
trine. Christian just warriors such as Aquinas and Calvin wish to
deny the lesson Simone Weil draws from her reading of Homer's
Iliad: that human beings lose their humanity when they fight in
war.3 It is also one of the key differences between Christian just
war thinking and liberal humanist thinking on war, which main-
tains that war is not merely inhumane but positively inhuman.
Just warriors worry that when we label war as something inher-
ently "inhuman," we simply give ourselves free reign to do inhu-
man things once it begins. History seems to bear this out to
some degree. As soon as we start wringing our hands with self-
imposed guilt, our own evil actions may follow-as they seemed
to do in both World Wars. Once we begin to believe that we are
acting viciously by the very nature of the case, then the tempta-
tion becomes to be a little more vicious and guarantee victory.
"Dirty hands" morality tells us that we have already crossed a
moral threshold in fighting a war to begin with, and once having
crossed that threshold, we may be tempted to make sure that it
was worth it and guarantee victory. And once we have guaran-
teed victory, we may be tempted further to go ahead and be even
more vicious in order to put an end to the whole sordid affair. In
short, once the first moral threshold is crossed, psychologically
speaking, it becomes easier to move further away from that
threshold. It is just this kind of reasoning that may be traced in
the Allied war planners in World War II. Certainly, it is just this
kind of thinking that drives just war critics like Paul Fussell to
2. Thucydides, VII.29.
3. See Simone Weil, The Illiad or the Poenq of Force, in RIvSIONS: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPtiY 222, 239 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair
MacIntyre eds., 1983). Only a pacifist-and a brilliant one such as Simone
Weil-could so read Homer.
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defend the Allied use of atomic bombs on Japan.4 When, how-
ever, we hold that war is something human, and as such, should
be something reasoned, purposeful, and just, then we have good
reasons to limit the kinds of wars we fight and how we behave
once the fighting begins.
I want to return to Thucydides for a moment. In his history
of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides attempted, among other
4. The question of whether we did especially vicious things in World War
II because we were already engaged in self-confessed "dirty hands" practices (a
sort of progressive decay in morality) or whether we did not see ourselves as
doing anything vicious in going to war, or even in doing things like obliteration
bombing, is, admittedly, an open one. I have two reasons for preferring the
former answer. First, the popular reasoning, given full evidence in Fussell, that
what we did in Japan with atomic weapons we had already been doing in Ger-
many in the way of obliteration bombing is, I believe, a perfect example of
"dirty hands" moral regression. The reasoning in Fussell goes like this: we were
already doing something morally evil when we saturated German cities with
bombs, so there is nothing wrong with committing more evil in order to get the
job done as quickly as possible. I suggest that noncombatant immunity is an
important moral threshold, and once crossed, it is hard to get back, but very
easy to keep going forward. The second reason comes from my reading ofJohn
Ford's essay "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," which argued that obliter-
ation bombing was a "regression toward barbarism," a regression that was prob-
ably psychologically impossible for the war leaders to deny. See John C. Ford
S.J., The Morality of Obliteration Bombing, in WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
138-77 (Richard B. Miller ed., 1992). For anyone to deny that one intention of
obliteration bombing is to harm innocent people is very nearly a psychological
impossibility, since the very thrust of the reasoning behind the strategy is to
terrorize citizens. I should also note here the disgust that some war leaders
expressed over the tactic, exemplified by General George Patton-not exactly
the most merciful leader in modern war-who called saturation bombing "bar-
baric and sadistic." See GEORGE S. PATRON JR., WAR As I KNEW IT 288 (1995).
Our war leaders seemed to realize, even if only very vaguely, that they were
doing something new and evil. Churchill even openly criticized the Nazis for
the practice of saturation bombing in the early days of the war. Ford argued
that the war leaders' consciences were not "sufficiently delicate" to trouble
them. Ford, supra note 4, at 62. I suggest that one important reason why their
consciences were not "sufficiently delicate" is "dirty hands" moral regression.
The overwhelming desire to shorten the war at any cost may be evidence of this.
Churchill may have been in a desperate situation in the early days of the war,
and may have wrestled mightily with his conscience when he first approved of
obliteration bombing practices. But Churchill continued to support the prac-
tice even when it became obvious that Britain was not in a supreme emergency.
He even encouraged the use of the atomic bombs on Japan. Again, I suggest
that Churchill crossed a threshold when he approved of obliteration bombing
tactics, a threshold that not only could he not get back over, but one from
which he continued to slip further away. Obviously I do not limit such criti-
cisms to Churchill and the British war leaders, for as even Rawls points out, "in
the case of Hiroshima many involved in higher reaches of government recog-
nized the questionable character of the bombing and that limits were being
crossed." JOHN RAwLs, COLLEcTED PAPERS 569 (1999).
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things, to show how the decline in Athenian fortune corre-
sponded roughly to a decline in virtue. In other words, Thucydi-
des was "doing ethics" (to use modern jargon) as he was writing
history. The moral of the story is that warfare reduces people to
their essential nature, and for those without virtue, that nature is
horrible to look upon. The story of the Peloponnesian war is, in
a moral sense, a timeless story, for it presents the story of most
wars in its essential form. As Victor Davis Hanson puts it, Thu-
cydides' story is "above all an intense, riveting, and timeless story
of strong and weak men, of heroes and scoundrels and innocents
too, all caught in the fateful circumstances of rebellion, plague,
and war that always strip away the veneer of culture and show us
for what we really are.
5
How groups of people act and react in violent situations says
a lot about what kind of people they are. As Alasdair MacIntyre
suggests, there is no ethical dimension to warfare; rather, ethics
"is the heart of the matter."6 Part of Christianity's very identity
can be found in how it reacts to warfare. This is not to say that
Christianity can be understood exhaustively vis-d-vis its reaction
to the violent situation, but it is to say that we ought to be able to
understand in part what it means, morally and spiritually speak-
ing, to be a Christian by looking at how Christians respond to
warfare.
The classical Christian just war doctrine looks at war as
something reasoned, purposeful, and possibly just. Against lib-
eral humanism, the classical Christian position insists that it is
possible for warfare to be a virtuous activity in which the failure
to engage would mean to behave in an unjust manner. Pundits
never tire of telling us that we now live in a post-Christian era,
but even if true, Christians should be wary of modifying their
basic moral norms simply because the governing authorities no
longer privilege them. Murder is wrong whether the church has
a say in the governing structure or not. Refusing to uphold jus-
tice is wrong whether the state privileges the church or not. Why
Christians ought to do things like fight just wars, what kinds of
wars Christians ought to support, and what kinds of combat
Christians ought or ought not to engage in, are things we can
learn from the classical Christian just war doctrine.
Christians ought to fight just wars because fighting just wars
is a divine-like activity that allows us to follow Christ "at a dis-
tance." Christians, that is to say, through the working of the Holy
5. Thucydides, supra note 2, Introduction, xxiii.
6. Alasdair Maclntyre, The Wrong Questions to Ask About War, THE HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1980, at 40.
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Spirit become faithful followers of Christ when they fight just
wars. God as revealed in Holy Scripture is a God who hates evil
and he sometimes uses his children to restrain evil. The norma-
tive structure of this restraint is found in the governing authori-
ties, which are ordained by God just for this purpose.
Nevertheless, not every kind of fighting is a legitimate way of fol-
lowing Christ. Just warriors insist that acts of force must there-
fore be acts ofjustice and love if they are to have a divine quality.
Thus Christians should not fight unjust wars, nor should they
fight unjustly or unlovingly in war. But what counts as unjust or
unloving? Here is where Aquinas can help us. Unjust wars are
those wars engaged in by those not in proper authority, or those
engaged in without a just cause, or those engaged in with evil
intention. These are definite and unmovable strictures. They
comprise the Christian just war, and Christians cannot and
should not support any proposed war that violates them.
More indefinite is what counts asjust or loving acts in war. A
great deal of this is culture-bound; that is to say, what counts as
virtuous action in conflicts will vary from place to place and from
time to time. Nevertheless, the Christian just war doctrine has set
up two broad strictures on combat behavior: the hoped-for good
of our acts must outweigh the expected but unintentional evil,
and we ought not to target innocent people. What counts as
"innocent" in modern, nationalized warfare is very tricky, but cer-
tainly we can discriminate, for example, in favor of the very
young, the very old, and the sick. Put another way, we can state
confidently that we ought not to harm intentionally those who
are able to play little or no direct role in the enemy's ability to
attack and defend. If I am right about this, just warriors will be
fundamentally opposed to terrorism and the liberal doctrine of
supreme emergency, which is nothing more than a justification
for Western terrorism.
I. JUST WARRIORS AND SUPREME EMERGENCY
The governing authorities represented by modern nation
states are useful things that Christian just warriors ought to sup-
port in some ways. One way the state might deserve Christian
support is when it decides to fight a just war (a war that has a just
cause and in which the state has no evil intention). Just warriors
must, of course, ask themselves if the state is likely to use just
force justly in the proposed conflict, and then decide if the risks
are too great for evil. What just warriors ought not to do is to
support wars that will issue inevitably into insoluble moral
problems. Alasdair Maclntyre has identified four principles for
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avoiding such dilemmas, and they are well worth considering, for
they represent a useful meeting ground for Christians and the
modern, liberal nation-state ethos on moral practices in war.
They are:
1. The only justification for war is either self-defense (to
preserve our liberty) or to preserve a people's liberty that
we have pledged to uphold.
2. We must not use greater force than is necessary to pre-
serve liberty.
3. We must not fail to threaten war or wage it whenever we
are confronted with what is stipulated in the first
principle.
4. We ought not to pledge military assistance to those whom
we ought not or cannot defend.7
Maclntyre's criteria are especially helpful to those whose
allegiance to the state can be characterized as Augustinian-an
allegiance to the state for bare-bones protection.8 Just warriors
will find it difficult to support wars undertaken to punish or
redress a wrong (two justifications found in classical just war doc-
trine) when the state does little more than provide protection
and insists that it has a positive duty to make sure that it is not
influenced by Christianity. Just warriors, however, should not
find it difficult to preserve the structure that restrains enough
evil to make a moral life possible. Just warriors can (and should)
even support the idea that certain other "distant neighbors" are
worthy of support should the need arise.
The second and third principles are embraced wholeheart-
edly by the Christian just war tradition, for the use of too much
force betrays a lack of good intention. Also, the positive demand
for engagement in war when justice is threatened fits nicely with
the just warrior's demand for engagement in those same
instances. One of the lessons we learn from just war defenders
such as Aquinas and Calvin is that it is a failure of virtue, both
7. See id. at 41.
8. Bare-bones protection is certainly a good, for it allows us to prosper, at
least to some degree, as moral agents in intermediary moral communities. Nev-
ertheless, two additional comments need to be noted concerning loyalty to a
government based only on its effectiveness in providing protection. First, if pro-
tection is all a citizen can expect from the state, one may wonder with Peter
Geach whether that state demands no more loyalty from its citizens than a "pro-
tection racketeer" does from its clients. See PETER GEACH, THE VIRTUES 124
(1977). Second, if the effectiveness of that protection becomes as unstable and
unpredictable as the protection offered by a racketeer, the demand for loyalty
becomes correspondingly weaker. See id.
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moral and theological, when we fail to fight a just war that we
ought to be fighting.
The last principle is a bit tricky. First, western nations are
apt to make agreements with other nations that Christians in
general will not want to support. Christians should not, for
example, fight in any war that would defend the present regime
in China. Or, to take a concrete example from the past, if we
had known the facts about Vietnam as they are known about, say,
present-day China, we ought not have supported or participated
in the Vietnam conflict because South Vietnam was not the kind
of ally we ought to be facilitating (nor was North Vietnam for
that matter). Second, it is difficult in the present day, with our
ability to go just about anywhere in the world in a matter of
hours, to distinguish exactly who we are capable of helping and
who we are not. In one sense, we can help anyone we want if we
are willing to put all our forces into the conflict. But, barring a
potential world war, that would be unwise. So we have to decide
how much force we are willing to expend for "humanitarian pur-
poses," and then decide if that is enough to get the job done.
Clearly our commitment did not meet our needs in Somalia.
One of the great values of MacIntyre's moral criteria for war
is that they help Christian citizens of liberal nation states decide
when their nation-state is fighting the sort of war in which Chris-
tians ought to be involved. This is no small work when one con-
siders how recent liberal scholars have defended a political
doctrine that would allow nations to target innocent people for
the sake of preserving their liberal, democratic way of life. I am
of course referring to the political doctrine of supreme
emergency.
One of G.E.M. Anscombe's chief complaints about modern
moral philosophy is that it constructs formally beautiful theories
of ethics, which always allow someone to commit dreadful acts in
the name of doing something that is the "morally right" thing to
do.9 Michael Walzer's concept of "supreme emergency" exem-
plifies this kind of thinking. Walzer's just war doctrine, though
he insists it is detached from foundations, is based upon a theory
of human rights:
There is a particular arrangement, a particular view of the
moral world, that seems to me the best one. I want to sug-
gest that the arguments we make about war are most fully
understood . . . as efforts to recognize and respect the
rights of individual and associated men and women. The
9. See generally G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS III:
ETHICS, RELIGION, AND POLITICS 33-34 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1981).
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morality I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doc-
trine of human rights."
Working within the presuppositions of human rights, Walzer
constructs an impressive case-based account of how the just war
criteria can and should operate. However, in the chapter entitled
"Supreme Emergency," the authority of the criteria "explodes."
In a nutshell, Walzer argues that if we are faced with the com-
plete collapse of civilization as we know it, then there are no
actions that we can take against such an evil power that could be
described as morally unjustified, so long as they are the only mea-
sures available to us. For example, if a nation with the character-
istics of Nazi Germany were on the verge of taking over our
civilization, there are no tactics too vicious to use so long as we
are faced with imminent defeat. The historical example
employed by Walzer is the Allied decision to use saturation
bombing on German cities during the early crisis days of World
War II. The important thing to notice is that even though satura-
tion bombing is inherently unjust (innocent civilians are deliber-
ately and willfully killed; that is, it is part of the very purpose of
saturation bombing to kill enough innocent civilians in order to
demoralize the enemy), it was the necessary thing to do in order
to ensure the survival of the anti-Nazi West. As Walzer puts it:
"necessity knows no rule."" Walzer co-opts this kind of reason-
ing into the present political situation to include the just posses-
sion and possible use of nuclear arms in similar circumstances.
Walzer never tries to make such bombing tactics honorable,
but merely morally acceptable in necessary circumstances. In
fact, he points out with approval how British Air Marshall Arthur
Harris (the brain behind saturation bombing) was not honored
by Churchill after the war, and, hence, was effectively dishon-
ored. 2 Harris nevertheless arguably made Allied victory possible
10. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xxix-xxx (1992).
11. Id. at 254.
12. See id. at 323-25. We might question whether the defacto dishonoring
of Harris would carry much moral weight in today's culture, and, indeed, if it
carried much weight in Harris's own time. As Peter Berger has suggested,
honor, like chastity, is now an outdated concept. See Peter Berger, On the Obso-
lescence of the Concept of Honor, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 172. Honor expresses status and group solidarity,
and it also provides links between self and community and self and ideal com-
munity (i.e. the community honors in the exceptional citizen that which it
wishes to see in all its citizens). Modern culture, however, has replaced honor
with dignity, for dignity admits to no social roles (and therefore no hierarchy).
See id. The military world is still an internal hierarchical world, but in this
respect, as in so many others, the military diverges from common culture.
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insofar as saturation bombing may have prevented the Nazis
from conquering Britain, and then, possibly, the rest of
Europe.1 3 Harris was therefore engaged in acceptable moral
action (but not honorable action) when he ordered saturation
bombing missions in the time of supreme emergency.
Walzer's consequentialism leaves him particularly vulnerable
to just war critics such as Paul Fussell, who, in an exchange with
Walzer, argued that war is a nasty business that should be
brought to an end as speedily as possible by any means. Insofar
as the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the
end of the war, they were, argues Fussell, the right thing to do.'"
Walzer responds to Fussell by agreeing that wars should be con-
cluded as speedily as possible, but that there are limits on how we
can bring them to a conclusion. One limit for Walzer is the
observance of noncombatant immunity. Fussell's parting reply
in the exchange is to point out that Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were in fact proper military targets (along with a typical, for Fus-
sell, ad hominem and non sequitur that Walzer was only ten years
old in 1945 and therefore cannot possibly be in a position to
render a good moral verdict).
Fussell is plainly wrong about the matter since part of the
very reason for dropping the bombs was to kill so many people-
innocent civilians as well as military personnel-that a horrified
and panic-stricken Japan would immediately and without condi-
tion capitulate. But what Walzer could not deny is that if the
Allies had been confronted with a "supreme emergency" in Japan
as they had been in Europe, then they could have been morally
justified in dropping atomic bombs, in as much as the action
could be described as morally acceptable in circumstances of
supreme emergency. Put differently, had the British possessed
atomic weapons during the early days of saturation bombing (the
time in which Britain was undergoing a legitimate "supreme
Thus, the dishonoring of a military official will carry moral weight only insofar
as that military official exists in a world in which honor has not given way to
mere dignity.
13. See generally WALZER, supra note 10, at 261, 323-25. This will always be
a debatable point, but for the sake of giving Walzer's argument the benefit of
the doubt, I offer no objection here.
14. Harris's acceptable moral practice of saturation bombing ended,
according to Walzer, as soon as the condition of supreme emergency ended.
Thus, all of the saturation bombing that took place after the supreme emer-
gency elapsed (say, at least beginning with early 1943) was simple "terror bomb-
ing," which is not a "dirty hands" act but a "criminal activity." WALZER, supra
note 10, at 323.
15. See PAUL FUSSELL, THANK GOD FOR THE ATOM BOMB AND OTHER
ESSAYS 13-44 (1980), for Fussell's argument and Walzer's response.
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emergency"), then Walzer would have to admit that Britain could
have been justified in dropping atomic bombs in Europe. Unsur-
prisingly, one of the few regrets Fussell expresses concerning the
use of atomic bombs in World War II is that the bombs were not
ready early enough to use on the Germans:
If only [the atomic bomb] could have been rushed into
production faster and dropped at the right moment on the
Reich Chancellery or Berchtesgaden or Hitler's military
headquarters in East Prussia ... much of the Nazi hierar-
chy could have been pulverized immediately, saving... the
lives of around four million Jews, Poles, Slavs, and gypsies,
not to mention the lives and limbs of millions of Allied and
German soldiers. If the bombs had only been ready in
time, the young men of my infantry platoon would not
have been so cruelly killed and wounded.16
Given what Walzer has said about supreme emergencies, he
seems to be very close to Fussell on this point. Walzer is at pains
to defend the just war criteria against Fussell's claims about the
moral appropriateness of dropping the atomic bombs on Japan,
pointing out that there are limits to how a just nation can go
about winning a war. The problem for Walzer is that in times of
true "supreme emergency," there seem to be no limits on what a
just nation may do to survive (e.g., when a nation may be all that
stands between Nazi rule and the discontinuance of western
democracy). Thus we see that the horrors that Walzer's conse-
quentialism may countenance are those very horrors Fussell
points to when he says that we have no reason to be ashamed of
our actions against Japan, because we had been destroying citi-
zens all along "in raids on Hamburg and Berlin and Cologne and
Frankfurt and Mannheim and Dresden and Tokyo."17
John Rawls, in his essay "Fifty Years After Hiroshima," con-
demns the "war is hell" doctrine that countenances vicious acts in
war as the "nature of the game."18 Rawls maintains that "[t]here
is never a time when we are free from all moral and political
principles and restraints."' 9 Rawls nevertheless follows Walzer in
making "supreme emergency" an exemption to the laws of war.
Supreme emergency is that doctrine which gives any nation a
right to use any means whatsoever to save itself.
16. Id. at 32.
17. Id. at 31.
18. RAwLs, supra note 4, at 572.
19. Id.
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Rawls, following Walzer, argues that "[civilians] can never be
attacked directly except in times of extreme crisis." 2° Therefore,
we can violate human rights-we can directly attack civilians-if
we are sure that we can do some "substantial good" by so doing,
and if the enemy is so evil that it is better for all well-ordered
societies that human rights be violated on this occasion. Rawls,
like Walzer, believes that the threat of Nazi Germany is a possible
historical example of a just Supreme Emergency Exemption.
Constitutional democracy in Europe was at stake; a "new Dark
Age" (to use Churchill's rhetoric) threatened. Thus Europe may
have been faced with a supreme emergency in the early days of
World War II, and, hence, Britain may have been justified in its
use of saturation bombing in the early days of the war.
Rawls realizes that the Supreme Emergency Exemption is
contrary to traditional Christian just war doctrine, but he main-
tains that the statesman must "be able to distinguish between the
interests of the well-ordered regime he or she serves and the dic-
tates of the religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine that he or
she personally lives by." 2' This is the crux of the matter, for it is a
clear case, to use Oliver O'Donovan's words, of "pitting political
order against human fulfilment [sic] ."22 In the eyes of the just
warrior, Rawls wants to drive a wedge between what it means to
flourish as a human being (doing God's will) and acting for the
good of society (preserving it with evil acts-acts contrary to
God's will). For the just warrior, then, Rawls's liberalism makes
liberal society, if not an absolute good, then certainly a good to
be sought above God. The reaction of the just warrior to all this
is best captured, again, by O'Donovan:
A "pure" political theory which can make it a matter of
intellectual conscience to disinterest itself in the transcen-
dent is not one that any humane thinker need feel guilt
about rejecting. If political order must be conceived in
that way, it would be well, perhaps, that theology should be
anti-political.23
For Christians the interests of the well-ordered regime can never
be given a value higher than God's will. No regime is worth
vicious acts for its survival. For in so preserving a regime, we
shape ourselves into something not pleasing to God; we become
creatures who rely on viciousness to survive. Christian just war
20. Id. at 567.
21. JOHN RAwLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 105 (1999).
22. OLIVER O'DoNOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE
ROOTS OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 122 (1996).
23. Id.
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politics insists that human beings please God, that they act virtu-
ously even when faced with extinction.
Just warriors insist thatjust war is a positive good. This does
not mean that virtuous citizens ought to be looking for any
excuse to fight a just war, but it does mean that when circum-
stances arise that demand a just use of force, the just warrior
knows that it is virtuous to engage in such a fight. Because just
war is a positive good, and because it is a virtuous activity to fight
just wars justly, the constraints on fighting are found in the very
reasons for fighting. On this account, soldiers do not suspend
our ordinary moral norms when they fight virtuously, but actually
fulfill one of their functions as human beings living in a fallen
world. But in fulfilling this function, the soldier must act virtu-
ously. Acting viciously in war is to cease to act in a way that con-
tributes to human flourishing. Remember, on the classical view,
pleasing God and human flourishing are inextricably linked; we
cannot flourish as human beings unless we please God.
Against Walzer and Rawls' "supreme emergency" exemp-
tion, the just warrior argues that it is better to be occupied by a
people such as the Nazis than to behave like Nazis. Walzer and
Rawls believe that to be occupied by a Nazi-like regime would
mean the end of everything we in the West hold dear. There are
two answers to be made. First, it probably does not mean the end
of all we hold dear, since no regime however vicious and totali-
tarian can last forever. Second, even if it did mean the end-the
very and final end-of all we hold dear, then we are holding the
wrong things too dearly. No true good will demand that we act
viciously in order to preserve it. If liberal constitutional democ-
racy demands that we act viciously to preserve it, then liberal con-
stitutional democracy is no true good. Of course no political
theory demands that it be upheld, rather defenders of political
regimes demand that they be preserved. Walzer and Rawls tell us
that liberal constitutional democracy is a good that we ought to
preserve even if it means we ought to act viciously to do it. For
the Christian, this demand betrays a disordered desire for a tem-
poral good. In the eyes of the Christian, Rawls and Walzer have
made the temporal political order a good to be sought above and
against a permanent and the final good-God. Thus, to follow
Rawls and Walzer in this matter is to treat liberal constitutional
democracy as an idol. Christians ought to value constitutional
democracy; they should value it to the point of dying for it if that
becomes necessary, but they should never value it so much that
they are tempted to kill innocent people to preserve it; they
should never put the survival of their political regime above God.
The idea that a state ought to be able to commit any vicious act
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whatsoever in order to survive is, I have pointed out, part of the
liberal political doctrine of two eminent political liberals-
Walzer and Rawls. Ironically enough, these two liberal thinkers
have something important in common with the religious-political
beliefs held by certain groups of Islamic fundamentalist ter-
rorists, and that is what I turn to now.
II. JUST WARRIORS AND TERRORISM
The recent terrorist attacks on the United States have
brought many people face to face with the fact of terrorism for
the first time. People are now more than ever beginning to ques-
tion the morality of such actions. Terrorism, however, has been
around for a long time. First, let us get our facts straight. Terror-
ism has one purpose: to weaken the morale of a nation in order
to move that attacked nation to desist in some activity the ter-
rorists find harmful to them. The usual method employed is ran-
dom murder of innocent civilians, though government and
military targets are sought as well.
Few moralists wish to justify acts of terrorism. Walzer, for
example, devotes an entire chapter to denouncing the practice.
Walzer nevertheless is able to draw moral distinctions between an
older form of terrorism found in the West in the early half of the
twentieth century (exemplified by Russian revolutionaries, the
IRA, and the Stern Group) and a newer form of terrorism found
in the East and Mideast in the last half of the century (exempli-
fied by Mao Tse-tung, the FLN, and Muslim fundamentalists).
Russian revolutionaries, the IRA, and the Stern Group attacked
people that the accepted war convention usually protected: high-
ranking government officials. But these terrorists often checked
their acts of terrorism when innocent people could get killed.
Thus, the "earlier" terrorists still recognized that some acts of vio-
lence could not be carried outjustly. Their targets were the gov-
ernment officials and politicians of regimes thought to be
oppressive. There was, then, a recognized group of noncomba-
tants. The distinguishing mark of the "newer" terrorism is that
there is no such recognized group. For those who follow the
teachings of Mao Tse-tung or the Hamas, all members of an
oppressive nation are legitimate targets.
In the late 1950s, the NLF (supporting North Vietnam)
assassinated 7,500 South Vietnamese people; another 6,300 were
abducted. But the range of targets soon expanded to any citizen
thought to be a supporter of the government-priests, landown-
ers, or any peasant too friendly with a landowner. Paul Ramsey
points out that this would be, in the United States, proportionate
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to having 72,000 people murdered or abducted.24 The terrorists
argued that such acts were justified by the principle of military
necessity. The argument goes like this: "We, ajust and oppressed
people, cannot possibly defeat the oppressive nation that over-
whelms us with military superiority. The only way we can become
free is to use military tactics that will force the oppressors to quit
oppressing us. If that means killing a lot of people our oppres-
sors call 'innocent,' then so be it."
I remarked above that few moralists wish to defend terrorist
attacks, but we should not forget Cicero's famous remark that
nothing is so foolish that some philosopher has not said it. Jean-
Paul Sartre is that philosopher. Sartre defended the FLN ter-
rorists in Algeria with typically eloquent prose: "To shoot down a
European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppres-
sor and the man he oppresses at the same time: there remains a
dead man and a free man."25 In other words, every time a terror-
ist kills a European-any European at all-that terrorist kills an
oppressor and creates a free person. The argument is so obvi-
ously nonsense, even if we grant the premise that every European
is responsible for oppressing some Algerian, that it is hard to
believe an intelligent person said it. As Walzer points out, this
perfect master-slave correlative does not exist in the real world.
Not every European is an oppressive master. Yet Sartre can
approve of the FLN killing even children in the name of freedom
without making the slightest case for how children could oppress
anyone. This is despicable moral reasoning and Walzer is right
to take Sartre to task for it.
Muslim terrorists are, perhaps, the most infamous terrorists
of the last quarter century. Although the IRA has committed its
recent share of unjust acts, Islamic fundamentalists have reached
new heights of destruction with the suicide missions that leveled
the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon. This is the
time to point out that terrorist acts are a form of irregular war-
fare and some forms of irregular warfare are encompassed both
within Western just war theory and Islamic notions of moral com-
bat. Western just war theory has extended its boundaries to
include irregular warriors; that is to say, irregular warfare is sub-
jected to the just war criteria. Francis Lieber's work on the laws of
war during the American Civil War is largely responsible for this
24. See PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
507 (1968).
25. Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction to FRANK FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE
EARTH 22 (Constance Farrington trans., 1968).
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move.26 During the war, Confederate guerilla parties were con-
sidered irregular because they wore no clothing to indicate that
they were soldiers. Lieber, however, argued that they should be
treated as regular soldiers so long as they fought justly. In short,
they had to follow the norms of the jus in bello. Classical Islam,
according to El Fadl, made similar moves. The Ahkam al-Bughat
comprises the rules that regulate the treatment of rebels. A num-
ber of important principles are derived by Sunni jurists from the
Ahkam al-Bughat, the most notable being that, during the rebel-
lion, "slaughtering of women, children and noncombatants was
prohibited."2 7
Modern Islamic terrorist organizations, unfortunately, are
unconstrained by Classical Sunni prohibitions. Modern "irregu-
lar" warriors, such as the Hamas and those led by Osama bin
Laden, view themselves as being in the same position as those
Muslims who faced Christian crusaders in the Middle Ages. Like
Saladin, these irregular warriors attempt, as John Kelsay puts it,
"to rid themselves of the rule of non-Muslims and to recover a
lost portion of the territory of Islam."2 The purpose of this sort
of jihad, therefore, is not expansion but recovery of what was
unjustly taken or to be free from an oppressor.
Islamic terrorist groups do not limit themselves to Western
injustice. This is why The Neglected Duty---the "testament" of
Islamic Jihad (the Egyptian band which killed Anwar Sadat)-
argues that any Muslim ruler who does not attempt to live by the
traditional law is an apostate not fit to rule; he must be fought.
The conduct of irregular warfare is not set by abstract principles.
According to The Neglected Duty, the nature of the enemy dictates
the kind of fighting that must be employed. Because the estab-
lished unjust forces greatly outnumber the just "irregulars," there
are almost no limits on how the war may be prosecuted. For
example, there is no restriction on killing innocent enemy civil-
ians. This should be avoided whenever possible, but Muslims
cannot be held responsible for the indirect consequences of a
"legitimate" attack on the enemy. As Kelsay points out, such
"irregular" tactics "stretch the fragile fabric of religious and
26. SeeJAMES F. CHILDRESS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFLICTS 95-163
(1982) (providing an excellent account of Lieber's contributions to the laws of
war).
27. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law
of Rebellion in Islam, in CROSS, CRESCENT AND SwoRD: THEJUSTIFICATION AND LIM-
ITATION OF WAR IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITION 149, 166 (James Turner
Johnson &John Kelsay eds., 1990).
28. JOHN KELSAY, ISLAM AND WAR: THE GuLF WAR AND BEYOND 97 (1993).
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moral traditions on the limitation of war so far that it breaks. 29
This is clearly seen in the use of Saladin as an example of what
Hamas and Islamic Jihad are doing. Saladin was famous for his
scrupulous behavior toward enemy soldiers and civilians. In fact,
Saladin behaved much better-observed the rules of war much
more closely-than his famous Christian counterpart, Richard
the Lionheart. The fit between past and present here is not only
"not precise," as Kelsay suggests, but actually nonexistent.
For Rawls and Walzer, of course, we cannot attack innocent
people because that is a violation of their rights. Nevertheless, if
Rawls and Walzer are right about supreme emergency, then
those rights are not absolute. In other words, innocent people
may still be attacked in war-directly and intentionally. On the
principle of supreme emergency, a just nation may override the
rights of the innocent civilians of an unjust nation. More to the
point: terrorism may be justified on grounds of supreme
emergency.
Islamic fundamentalists perceive the West-especially the
United States-as evil because the United States oppresses Mus-
lim people. The United States, in Muslim eyes, does this indi-
rectly through its "unjust" support of Israel. The United States'
support is seen as unjust in the sense that the United States sup-
ports a homeland for Jews in the Middle East, a homeland that
displaced a whole lot of Muslim people, and that the United
States supports Israel's anti-Palestinian policies. The United
States also oppresses Muslims through its economic policies that
favor Westerners at the expense of Third World and Islamic
countries. The United States is too powerful to fight in a conven-
tional manner. The only way to throw off this oppressor is to
strike the oppressor in such a way that the oppressor will quit
oppressing. Random acts of murder are the only effective means
available. In the eyes of the terrorists, they are in a supreme
emergency. Their entire civilization is at stake, and, as Walzer
and Rawls admit, when an entire civilization is at stake, the inno-
cent are legitimate targets.
We have three ways of rebutting the argument: deny that the
terrorist's civilization is in grave peril; deny that the West is the
oppressor; or deny that the civilization is one worth preserving
with immoral acts (as is the liberal West). The second and third
are hardest to support. Islamic civilization is certainly a civiliza-
tion worth preserving. Also, it is hard to deny that the West, and
the United States in particular, has not exactly always played fair
with Muslim nations. Of course, it is quite another matter to say
29. Id. at 107.
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that the United States is so systematically oppressing Muslims
that Islamic civilization is in peril, which is what the Islamic ter-
rorists are in fact claiming. This brings us to the third possible
rebuttal. We wish to claim that Islamic civilization is not being
threatened gravely, either by the United States or any other West-
ern power. But this is not enough, for who is to decide? To para-
phrase MacIntyre: Whose supreme emergency? Which
rationality? The point is this: if Islamic terrorists truly perceive
the West to be such a grave threat to their way of life, then they
may resort to killing innocent people in order to preserve their
way of life. That is the logic of supreme emergency. Put another
way, terrorism is nothing more than supreme emergency in
action.
Classical just war doctrine brooks no deliberate, intentional
killing of the innocent. Killing innocent people can never be
virtuous, can never be sanctifying, and can never bring you closer
to God. Too, classical Islamic laws governing combat behavior
deny that such acts can lead the Muslim to paradise. Thus, on
this point, classical Christian and classical Islamic accounts of
morality in war are in complete agreement. Ironically enough,
the subject of terrorist attacks, the very area of violence the West
finds so deplorable, and the area that seems such a hurdle for
Muslim participation in the international legal system, is an area
of the common human experience: the moral distaste of killing
innocent people. Both religious traditions have such a dislike for
killing the innocent that both will never justify the killing of
innocent people as the morally right thing to do.
The next question to deal with is exactly how to deal with
terrorists: how can we strike back at targets who hide themselves
among the innocent? Paul Ramsey, in the course of arguing
about how we may fight guerilla fighters, claimed that when gue-
rilla fighters hid and attacked among the innocent, they (the
guerillas) and not the just fighters were responsible for the
deaths of innocent people that would occur when the just
attacked the guerillas. The principle of double-effect is what may
allow for such a scenario. The two key points are whether the
deaths of the innocent are a means to the goal, and if not, are
the deaths worth the goal. Notice that there is no need to go to
the second point if we cannot satisfy ourselves on the first. We
can never kill the innocent as a means to killing the guilty. We
may, of course, kill the innocent per accidens, as an unintentional
byproduct of killing the enemy. In such a case the deaths of the
innocent play no part in meeting the goals of the action. In the
case of striking back at terrorist organizations, this would mean
being able to find out where they are hiding. We cannot simply
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use obliteration bombing tactics as we did in World War II. If we
are reasonably sure that we know where they are hiding, then we
may possibly target them, even if they are hiding out in an area
populated by innocent civilians. In such a case, it is the terrorists
who are targeted and not the civilians, and it is the terrorists who
are to blame for the deaths of innocent people they hide among.
But we still have to count the costs. How many civilians do we
estimate will die as a result of our attack? Does the estimated
number outweigh the good sought? Nowhere are the virtues
more necessary in war than here. The ability to make such deci-
sions requires a great deal of prudence (and mercy). We can
only hope and pray that our political leaders, military com-
manders, and soldiers possess this sort of virtue; that is hoping
and praying for a lot.
III. CONCLUSION
Warfare may be defined out of existence, but it can never be
eliminated. Semantic victories purchase very little on a field of
battle that will remain whether we call such actions "war-making"
or "policing." Warfare will be a permanent part of the human
condition until God puts an end to history. All wars are in some
sense inhumane, because they cause suffering to those who do
not deserve it. But not all wars are unjust; that is to say, not all
wars debilitate human flourishing. Christian just war doctrine
uses the jus ad bellum to distinguish just wars that allow us to
flourish as human beings from unjust wars that prevent us from
flourishing. Wars fought without proper authority, wars fought
without a just cause, and wars fought without a good intention
are unjust wars strictly speaking, for they are wars the prosecu-
tion of which debilitates virtue. Just wars are wars in which the
failure to prosecute makes us unjust. Put differently, we fail to be
all that we are intended by God to be as human beings when we
refuse to fight just wars or when we fight unjustly. So, to be abso-
lutely clear on this point: unjust acts in war are acts that prevent
us from flourishing; they are acts that fail to display virtue and
thus fail to make us more like what God intends us to be.
The battles fought in any war will issue in inhumane acts; for
barring human perfection and a very remote battlefield, inno-
cent people will suffer. But just warriors maintain that the very
"inhumaneness" we are talking about here should come from
unintentional acts only, and this points to our humanity. We do
not flourish-we do not follow Christ-when we intentionally
cause suffering to innocent people. Christian just warriors main-
tain that we do not have to act unjustly in order to fight wars
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successfully, and it is a good sign that we should not be fighting a
proposed war if the only way to win is to fight unjustly. Christian
just war doctrine uses the jus in bello to help identify unjust acts in
war that prevent human flourishing. It is unjust to resort to vio-
lence when we know that the evil we cause will outweigh the
expected good. It is unjust intentionally to attack innocent peo-
ple. But it is just to a very high degree to fight virtuously in ajust
war, for in fighting virtuously, soldiers are elevated by God
through their virtuous acts. Human beings are made by the Holy
Spirit (grace) more fit for beatitude with God when they fight
just wars virtuously. In short, we flourish as human beings when
we fight just wars justly. This is because all acts of charity, acts
that proceed from a love of God, are acts that make us more like
what God intends us to be. And nothing is more profitable for a
human being than engaging in practices, whatever those prac-
tices may be, that make one more fit for beatitude with God.
Terrorism can never be justified on Christian just war grounds.
Christian just warriors choose death before dishonor. Terrorists
and upholders of supreme emergency choose dishonor before
death.

